Explanations, belief revision and defeasible reasoning

Artificial Intelligence 141 (1-2):1-28 (2002)
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Abstract

We present different constructions for nonprioritized belief revision, that is, belief changes in which the input sentences are not always accepted. First, we present the concept of explanation in a deductive way. Second, we define multiple revision operators with respect to sets of sentences (representing explanations), giving representation theorems. Finally, we relate the formulated operators with argumentative systems and default reasoning frameworks.

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Guillermo Ricardo Simari
Universidad Nacional del Sur

References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Belief contraction without recovery.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (2):251 - 260.

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