The Idea of ‘Moral Relativism’ in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche

Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (2):213-227 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper, I shall apply the idea of ‘moral relativism’ in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The concept of ‘moral relativism’ has been closely related to postmodernism, and in particular proponents of Aristotlian reject Nietzsche’s kind of relativism, yet the issues remained part of Nietzsche’s philosophy and prominently situated in his philosophical works. Nietzsche talks about morality as antinature, he thinks that how morality is repressive ‘relative’ to what we might concern as the unbridled manifestation of wants and needs and appetites. In his famous publications of Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), Nietzsche argues intensively and effectively about morality, his thought undoubtedly has a pronounced relativistic tendencies. Moral values are not universal and absolute, but are therefore conditional constructions of particular group at particular times with particular goals. Nietzsche speaks in the “interpretation” or “perspective” regarding morality or values in particular. According to Nietzsche, no one kind of morality is correct and neither is incorrect nor unacceptable for everyone; it should be noted that Nietzsche considers that each is correct for one type of person and incorrect for others. This makes it possible for Nietzsche to take a more important level on moral relativism.

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