Psychological Causes in Plato’s Phaedo

Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (2):196-216 (2022)
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Abstract

Nearly all of us would accept that at least some of our thoughts – desires, beliefs, and intentions, for example – can be causally responsible for movements in our bodies. Starting in antiquity, and especially since Descartes, philosophers have deployed this claim as the pivotal premise in an increasingly popular line of argument against dualism. The purpose of this paper is to show that, in the Phaedo, Socrates uses this very same claim as the pivotal premise in a surprisingly powerful two-part argument for dualism.

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Matthew Evans
Open University (UK)

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