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How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else)
Abstract
In responding to Prof. Allen's paper, I make several general methodological points: about the use of hypothetical cases, about the point of theorizing, and about the role of idealization. Then I make some more specific points about his claims about (and against) previous work on statistical evidence.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The law's Aversion to Naked Statistics and Other Mistakes.Ronald J. Allen & Christopher K. Smiciklas - 2022 - Legal Theory 28 (3):179-209.
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