Abstract

The author takes a collection of essays on concepts and approaches in evolutionary epistemology as the occasion for a critical discussion of the limits and achievements of evolutionary epistemology as well as of certain philosophical objections to the very project itself. She comes to the conclusion that evolutionary epistemology, even if it cannot explain cognition itself, can nevertheless shed light on the complex phenomenon of cognition by demonstrating the presence of traces of our evolutionary past in cognition. Modern research into the structure and functioning of the brain supports this conclusion. The author argues that the questions which evolutionary epistemology can legitimately pose and answer are such that it is not in competition with traditional epistemology. For this reason she suggests that this research program be renamed "evolutionäre Informationstheorie", in the hope that its aims will become clearer to proponents as well as opponents. In the final section the author discusses the possibility that an evolutionary approach might explain the fact that human beings are less and less capable of dealing with the complexity of the world they have created