Positivism and normative inference: Two key legal problems of late modernity

Abstract

Two false dichotomies, "no is from ought" and "either natural law or positivism" impair current legal thought. This article exposes those dichotomies and explains why they are not in fact accurate using Professor Duncan Kennedy's work as a foil for the exposition.

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