Measuring Social Welfare by Proximity to an Optimum Population

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):217-249 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay introduces a new type of measure of social welfare, where populations are evaluated by their resemblance to an optimum population, which is an (in principle) possible population with the highest degree of social welfare, relative to some circumstances. Here it is argued to be the largest possible population where everyone fares maximally well. The new measure is responsive to quality of welfare, equality of welfare, and the number of people. It satisfies dominance and negative monotonicity, and it avoids both the repugnant conclusion and a reverse repugnant conclusion for comparisons relative to our future on earth.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,458

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Very Repugnant Conclusion.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 29-44.
Repugnant Conclusions.Mark Budolfson - 2021 - Social Choice and Welfare 57.
One more axiological impossibility theorem.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2009 - In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. pp. 23-37.
Non-Archimedean population axiologies.Calvin Baker - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-22.
Quasi-orderings and population ethics.Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David Donaldson - 1996 - Social Choice and Welfare 13 (2):129--150.
Person-Affecting Moralities.Nils Holtug - 2004 - In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 129–161.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-03-21

Downloads
88 (#238,737)

6 months
10 (#411,161)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Karin Enflo
Umeå University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - International Journal of Ethics 4 (4):512-514.

View all 27 references / Add more references