Abstract

The problem of free will has a long and intricate history. The millennia of development of the problem have seen the evolution of numerous free will viewpoints. A cursory look at the evolution of the concepts of free will and determinism, the various arguments, counterarguments, complex adjustments to arguments, the variety of sources of empirical research, and empirical insights illustrate the complexity of the debate. This elaborate reality opens itself to a pluralist account of free will and moral responsibility capable of accommodating this complexity and apparent contradiction. In this dissertation, I present such a pluralist account. I argue that a pluralistic approach to free will and moral responsibility makes room for discontinuities, accounts for conflicting free will values and regret, and acknowledges dissimilar responses to moral responsibility situations. I lay out the framework for this approach by engaging with free will research from moral psychology, investigating the findings of the sciences, such as neuroscience and physics, and considering our common-sense understanding of free will.