The Mark of a Good Informant

Acta Analytica 35 (3):319-331 (2020)
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Abstract

Edward Craig and Michael Hannon agree that the function of knowledge is to enable us to identify informants whose word we can safely take. This requires that knowers display a publicly recognizable mark. Although this might suffice for information transfer, I argue that the position that emerges promotes testimonial injustice, since the mark of a good informant need not be shared by all who are privy to the facts we seek. I suggest a way the problem might be alleviated.

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Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

References found in this work

True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant.Miranda Fricker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):249-276.
On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig.Klemens Kappel - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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