The Aims of Logical Empiricism As a Philosophy of Science

Acta Analytica 15 (25):137-59 (2000)
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Abstract

According to the received view on logical empiricism, the logical empiricists were involved in the same project as Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn: a project of describing actual scientific method and (with the exception of Kuhn) prescribing methodological rules for scientists. Even authors who seek to show that the logical empiricists were not as simpleminded as widely believed agree with this assumption. I argue that the received view has it wrong.

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Matti Eklund
Uppsala University

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