Thickness and Evaluation

Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):89-104 (2017)
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Abstract

This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Väyrynen’s The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty. Väyrynen’s book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Väyrynen’s arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Väyrynen’s arguments generalize to thin evaluative concepts.

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Matti Eklund
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Normative concepts.Matti Eklund - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati, The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
Grounding Thick Normative Facts.Justin Morton - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):408-431.

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References found in this work

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Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.

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