Die Monade in Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (4):692 (1995)
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Abstract

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not a mere egology, but gets its concrete accomplishment only as a phenomenology of 'transcendental intersubjectivity'. However, the subjective centers of any transcendentality and thus of every constitution — even of intersubjectivity itself — have to be such unities as Leibniz' 'monads', that is, individually concrete subjects producing all their representations of one another completely out of themselves, respectively. Thus the problem arises, how the genuine transcendental status of each monadic subject in all its constitutive achievements could be maintained so that they develop their own intentional lives in a universal mutual accordance, without presupposing again a supra-monadic ground for their 'harmony', i.e. a higher-levelled ordering unity. I shall argue that th peculiar Husserlian 'transcendental monadology' is inevitably bound to this intrinsic paradox which can at best be reduced to a mere postulate but never be resolved.

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