Abstract

This thesis investigates the scientific work of Robert Hooke as a case study that will make possible evaluation of the relative merits of two current interpretations of the Scientific Revolution. "Traditional" scholarship holds that the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century was fundamentally mechanical in nature; explanations of natural phenomena that utilized unintelligible occult qualities and active principles were rejected in favor of those that relied solely upon the contact of material bodies. Recent "revisionist" scholarship has suggested, however, that many scientists traditionally identified as mechanical philosophers actually employed occult qualities and active principles in their interpretations of nature. This dissertation examines the natural philosophy and methodology of one such scientist, Robert Hooke, in order to elucidate his view of the operation of nature. ;Revisionists such as John Henry and Simon Schaffer have noted that Hooke frequently employed terms with active and spiritualistic connotations in his theories of nature. For instance, Hooke's concept of congruity harkens back to the occult properties of sympathy and antipathy. Nonetheless, close examination of Hooke's writings demonstrates that he consistently advocated entirely mechanical theories of nature. Many of his uses of non-mechanical terminology were actually attempts to show that mechanical theories could explain phenomena that other philosophers had attributed to active agents. Moreover, careful analysis of Hooke's methodology reveals that he consistently advocated the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy, and that these hypotheses universally concerned the hidden mechanical causes at work in nature. ;While close textual analysis reveals that Hooke was a mechanical philosopher, the same is not true for all figures traditionally identified as mechanists. Even brief surveys of the views of Walter Charleton and Isaac Newton on the problem of causation reveal that they incorporated selected active agents in their philosophical systems. It is clear that a simple dichotomy between mechanist and non-mechanist does not adequately capture the complexity of seventeenth century conceptions of nature. Rather, attention must be given to the relative roles of mechanism and activity in order to attain a fuller understanding of natural philosophy during the seventeenth century.