Fission theories of Original Guilt

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (1):15-30 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One reading of the Doctrine of Original Sin has it that we are guilty of a sin committed by Adam, thousands of years ago. Fission theorists account for this by saying that Adam fissioned after he sinned and that each of us is one of his ‘fission successors’. This paper recaps the current discussion in the literature about this theory, arguing that the proposed version does not work for reasons already raised by Rea and Hudson. I then introduce a new version of fission theory that avoids the Rea-Hudson objection.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,636

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Johnston on fission.Brian J. Garrett - 2004 - Sorites 15 (December):87-93.
A Diversified Approach to Fission Puzzles.Justin Mooney - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (9):481-500.
Reply to Roache.Simon Langford - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):676-681.
Parfit on fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.
A survival guide to fission.Mark Moyer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322.
Fission and anticipating having an experience.Douglas Ehring - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12223-12234.
The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects.Thomas Sattig - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):594-623.
Personal identity, fission and time travel.John Wright - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):129-142.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-01-08

Downloads
49 (#450,909)

6 months
5 (#1,059,814)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nikk Effingham
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references