The surprise exam paradox: a note on formulating it and a solution to it

Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 12 (2):181-186 (2019)
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Abstract

Some formulations of the surprise paradox involve a pair of unnecessary and controversial assumptions. After casting doubt on these assumptions, I propose a solution to the paradox.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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References found in this work

How to set a surprise exam.Ned Hall - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):647-703.
Blindspotting and Choice Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):337 - 352.

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