Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind

Noûs 47 (1):342-367 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper explores the psychological analogues of a cluster of arguments that have played an important role in motivating a now widespread, reference-based approach in philosophy of language. What I will call the psychological analogues of Kripke-style arguments provide a substantial motivation for a reference-based approach to concepts. Insofar as such an approach is rarely given serious consideration, the availability of these arguments suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions in philosophy of mind and other branches of the cognitive sciences.

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2014

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10.1111/nous.12009

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Kevan Edwards
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

The Publicity of Thought.Andrea Onofri - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272).

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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