Abstract

This paper takes aim at strawman characterisations of non-ideal epistemology. To be precise – I pre-empt one objection to the central argument advanced by Robin McKenna in his book, ‘Non-Ideal Epistemology’. The objection I have in mind is this: all forms of choice in non-ideal epistemological settings constitute, to a greater or less extent, cases of ‘epistemic satisficing’. Epistemic satisficing,Footnote1 on my account, approximates to situations in which agents knowingly reject the better for the good enough. She chooses the good enough because it realises this aim. Satisficers thus aim for good enough. Optimisers, in this case, ideal epistemologists, aim for normatively robust purist forms of epistemic rationality, free from contextually contingent constraints on epistemic options, neatly abstracted away from human cognitive limitations. The charge I try to defend non-ideal approaches from is that it permits agents to knowingly reject the better for the good enough. A large part of the problem, as I see it, rests on disambiguating epistemic satisficing, bounded rationality, and idealization projects in epistemology.Footnote2 Might non-ideal epistemologists be accused of validating those who waste their time on ‘good enough’ when they could do better?Footnote3 Contra such mischaracterisations, I defend non-ideal epistemology from the charge of inappropriate epistemic satisficing, a position in which agents knowingly reject the ‘better’ for the ‘good enough’, not because of some countervailing consideration, but because it realises agents’ aim of good enough – good enough fitting some mix of subjective/objective context-specific criterion.