Skeptical Motivators in Buridan’s Philosophy of Science

In Joshua P. Hochschild (ed.), Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. Springer. pp. 273-285 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper examines John Buridan’s account of induction and its relation to intellectus, the Latin equivalent of nous, and argues that Buridan’s view of the relation between induction and intellectus is shaped largely by his sensitivity to skeptical concerns. Buridan includes induction in his account of our cognition of indemonstrable principles, but his recognition of these skeptical concerns leads him to the conclusion that induction itself is not productive of such principles. Rather, the primary role of induction is to train and cultivate the innate power of intellectus so as to ensure that its natural assent to universal principles does not go astray. Induction accomplishes this by providing counter-examples to generalizations, when available.

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Ariane Economos
Marymount University

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