Epistemic Political Egalitarianism, Political Parties, and Conciliatory Democracy

Political Theory 44 (5):629-656 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article presents two interlocking arguments for epistemic political egalitarianism. I argue, first, that coping with multidimensional social complexity requires the integration of expertise. This is the task of political parties as collective epistemic agents who transform abstract value judgments into sufficiently coherent and specific conceptions of justice for their society. Because parties thus severely lower the relevant threshold of comparison of political competence, citizens have reason to regard each other as epistemic equals. Drawing on the virulent “peer disagreement debate,” I then analyze the epistemic significance of political disagreement. I contend that citizens ought to pursue epistemic conciliation, an idea I contrast to the ideals of compromise and of consensus. Subsequently, I introduce insights from public choice theory and empirical findings which show that and why multi-party electoral competition coupled with equal rights to participation tends to produce conciliatory outcomes. We thus have reason to endorse political egalitarianism on epistemic grounds.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,506

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Peerhood and Moral Compromise.Simon Căbulea May - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
Disagreeing with the (religious) skeptic.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
Erratum to: Disagreeing with the (religious) skeptic. [REVIEW]Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):19-19.
Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.
The Epistemology of Disagreement.Michel Croce - 2023 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-04

Downloads
71 (#322,174)

6 months
5 (#851,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Is moral deference reasonably acceptable?Martin Ebeling - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (3):296-309.
The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy.Christoph Schamberger - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-19.
Cracking the whip: the deliberative costs of strict party discipline.Udit Bhatia - 2020 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 23 (2):254-279.
The Astute and the Kindly Ones.Marc Andree Weber - 2024 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 101 (1):1-27.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references