Socially Learned Cheating Behavior Through Faculty Deterrence

Journal of Business Ethics Education 21:47-72 (2024)
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Abstract

This study investigates the influence of faculty deterrence and social acceptance on cheating behavior, addressing the central research question: Does high faculty deterrence reduce students' perceptions of cheating as socially acceptable compared to low faculty deterrence? A sample of 190 Bahamian undergraduate students representing various academic majors were randomly assigned to two vignettes depicting testing environments with either high or low faculty deterrence. Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of students who would consider cheating socially acceptable under each scenario. The key findings indicate that high faculty deterrence significantly discourages perceptions of cheating, while low deterrence fosters a justification for unethical behavior. Notably, criminal justice majors from the School of Social Sciences were the only group to exhibit significantly different views between high and low deterrence conditions, while other academic majors, including business students, showed no significant differences. These findings align with Liebler’s research on U.S. undergraduate business students, suggesting that faculty oversight plays a crucial role in shaping ethical perceptions. The results have important implications for business ethics education, emphasizing the need for solid faculty engagement to promote academic integrity. Additionally, the discipline-specific differences highlight the importance of incorporating tailored ethical training across various fields of study.

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