Modal Quantification Without Worlds

In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-186 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper is about avoiding commitment to an ontology of possible worlds with two primitives: a hyperintensional connective like ‘in virtue of’, and primitive quantification into predicate position. I argue that these tools (which some believe can be independently motivated) render dispensable the ontology of possible worlds needed by traditional anaylses of modality. They also shed new light on the notion of truth-at-a-world.

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Billy Dunaway
University of Missouri, St. Louis

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References found in this work

A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
A Theory of Properties.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-138.
Varieties of supervenience.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.
Ways worlds could be.Peter Forrest - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):15 – 24.

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