Violence and Accusation

Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 31 (1):15-25 (2024)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Violence and AccusationPaul Dumouchel (bio)ACCUSATIONAn accusation is at first sight a triadic relation. Accusing relates three poles: the accuser, the accused, and what he or she is accused of—which is also often referred to simply as the "accusation," as if that accusation, the fault or the crime that is reproached in the person, were enough to define what it is to accuse. A person accuses another one of something, which is then three terms. This is both a social and a mundane relation: social because it relates two agents, and mundane, because the person accused is not what he or she is accused of, which pertains to the world—to what is—and in that sense is an object. The object of the accusation, the fault or crime, the accused's action that is condemned by the accusation is something that is different from the accused him or herself. Though this action is in some way a "nonmaterial" object, it is certainly not immaterial. The accusation remains in the world, which it has changed by declaring someone guilty of something. It is therefore a mundane [End Page 15] object, something that can be accessed and talked about by different people. "He robbed his father!" or "She set the house on fire."The apparent simplicity of the accusation as a triadic relation is, however, misleading, because an accusation is, by definition, not addressed primarily, or partially, nor even at all to the accused. The accusation is always addressed to one or more others, to third parties who are neither the accuser nor the accused. This is unlike a curse, which is (or at least can be) a relation of pure sociality, that is, a relation that remains confined to the limited domain defined by the person who curses and the other who is cursed.1 An accusation, to the contrary, is always open to the public, a public to which it is addressed. Through his accusation the accuser solicits the support and help of others, of third parties to whom it is addressed. Further, the accusation only succeeds when third parties agree with the accuser and accept to condemn the accused, or at least to hear the accuser. The success of an accusation therefore is not in the hands of the accuser, nor of course of the accused, but in the hands of those to whom it is addressed.That is why accusations always play a role in collective violence. The whole point of the accuser in formulating the accusation is to get others to join in his conflict with the accused. Accusers seek allies. They are asking for the force and violence, or at least for the "moral" support of others. That is why collective violence can only be understood if we take into account the role of third parties in relations with the accusations made against the victims.An accusation is already in itself a form of violence, precisely because, unlike a reproach, it is not really addressed to the person whom it targets. It is not a form of dialogue between the accuser and the accused, but an action that indicates that "there is no point talking," that what is needed or desired to put an end to the conflict is the force that others can bring or for the accused to recognize his or her fault. Because it does not imply any dialogue with the accused, as a gesture an accusation can be extremely simple. Accusing can even be done without using language, simply by pointing at someone. In many circumstances that gesture is enough to designate a culprit, a victim, someone who should not be there, or not there at that time. Pointing can provide a sufficient answer to many questions like "who did this?" or "how did this happen?," but also to unformulated questions, for example, a general sense of unease. Pointing is enough to indicate the person who has done something that should not have been done. Accusing is also a form of violence because, especially in the absence of culturally or legally well-defined contexts, the consequences to which the accusation may lead for the accused are to the...

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