Can a relational substance ontology be hylomorphic?

Synthese 198 (Suppl 11):2717-2734 (2019)
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Abstract

The debate between relational versus constituent substance ontology is longstanding and ongoing. In the contemporary literature it is mostly taken for granted that any version of hylomorphism must count as a constituent substance ontology. Here I argue that a certain sort of relational substance ontology could also legitimately be labeled hylomorphic, and in fact that relational substance ontologists have some good reasons to affirm this version of hylomorphism.

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Travis Dumsday
Concordia University of Edmonton

Citations of this work

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness.Ben Page - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3755-3775.
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A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Abstract particulars.Keith Campbell - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

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