Social Insurance and the Argument from Autonomy

Public Reason 5 (1) (2013)
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Abstract

In recent decades politicians and policy-makers have emphasised the need to shift from a “passive” to an “active” welfare state. This has resulted in policies that reduce compensation rates in social insurance or make compensation conditional on different requirements such as participation in rehabilitation or vocational training. This article argues that such policies are justified if they tend to ensure an adequate level of personal autonomy. To that effect, a ‘thick’ conception of personal autonomy is spelled out based on Norman Daniels’ extension of the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Some objections to policies limiting entitlement to social insurance are discussed. It is argued that although the objections fail to show that limited entitlement to social insurance is always unjustified, they identify considerations that must be taken into account for an overall assessment of such policies.

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References found in this work

Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly.Norman Daniels - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - Philosophy 64 (250):571-572.

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