Truth-assessment Methodology and the Case against the Relativist Case 1 a gainst Contextualism about Deontic Modals

Res Philosophica 94 (3):325-357 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent challenges to Kratzer’s canonical contextualist semantics for modal expressions are united by a shared methodological practice: Each requires the assessment of the truth or warrant of a sentence in a scenario. The default evidential status accorded these judgments is a constraining one: It is assumed that, to be plausible, a semantic hypothesis must vindicate the reported judgments. Fully assessing the extent to which these cases do generate data that puts pressure on the canonical semantics, then, requires an understanding of this methodological practice. Here I argue that not all assessments are fit to play this evidential role. To play it, we need reason to think that speakers’ assessments can be reasonably expected to be reliable. Minimally, having such grounds requires that assessments are given against the background of non-defectively characterized points of evaluation. Assessing MacFarlane’s central challenge case to contextualism about deontic modals in light of this constraint shows that his judgments do not have the needed evidential significance. In addition, new experimental data shows that once the needed scenario is characterized non-defectively, none of the resulting range of cases provides data that cannot be accommodated by a Kratzer-style contextualism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,337

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Flexible Contextualism about Deontic Modals: A Puzzle about Information-Sensitivity.J. L. Dowell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):149-178.
Contextualism about Deontic Conditionals.Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-142.
The Language of Reasons and 'Ought'.Aaron Bronfman & J. L. Dowell - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
DO IGNORANT ASSESSORS CASES POSE A CHALLENGE TO RELATIVISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC MODALS?Heidi Furey - forthcoming - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 16.
Discourse Contextualism.J. L. Dowell - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):562-566.
New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals.Justin Khoo & Jonathan Phillips - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):309-324.
Deontic Modals.Jennifer Carr - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 194-210.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-27

Downloads
133 (#166,004)

6 months
11 (#345,260)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Janice Dowell
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Discourse Contextualism.J. L. Dowell - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):562-566.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
On Quantifier Domain Restriction.Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (2-3):219--61.
Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.

View all 23 references / Add more references