Lewis on fallible knowledge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):573 – 580 (2005)
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Abstract

Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is non-fallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.

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10.1080/00048400500338963

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
Lewis on iterated knowledge.Bernhard Salow - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1571-1590.
Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples.Alex Davies - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):475-499.

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Contextualism and skepticism.Richard Feldman - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:91-114.
Lewis, the lottery and the preface.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):242-251.
A Skeptic’s Reply to Lewisian Contextualism.I. T. Oakley - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):309-332.

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