A role for normativism

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):252-253 (2011)
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

References found in this work

A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-335.

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