Prudential Perfectionism: A Refinement

Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-19 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Perfectionism, the view according to which the good for an x is constituted by flourishing as an x, is a venerable account of the good, the popularity of which has only grown in recent decades. In this paper, I assess the merits of perfectionism in its traditional form, and argue in favor of a refinement. Specifically, I focus on traditional perfectionism’s account of the Central Axiological Category (CAC)---the kind ("x") that subjects fall into for the purposes of determining their good. I argue that shifting our understanding of the CAC from the traditional human category to the category of valuer is faithful to the most significant perfectionist insights, and does not succumb to the numerous and substantial challenges for the traditional understanding.

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Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

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References found in this work

Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.
Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction.Richard J. Arneson - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1):113-142.
Welfare Invariabilism.Eden Lin - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):320-345.

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