Abstract

The trouble with situation ethics from an author’s point of view is that the whole thing can be summed up in a few sentences. This means that it is difficult to write a book about it—and doubly difficult to write a second book about it. Joseph Fletcher has solved this problem by publishing as his second book a series of articles about half of which were published prior to his first book while the others merely repeat what he has said already. This second book gives us new examples of situation ethics but little new thinking on the subject. Chapter IX on Euthanasia is typical: it is written at the level of a popular magazine. Having given a stock outline of the problem Fletcher proposes his ‘solution’—creative and courageous facing up to the issues! Chapter X on Business is perhaps the best. Here Fletcher shows himself aware of some of the objections which can be made against his position—objections based on a consideration of long-term consequences of certain types of acts. He also shows awareness of why his opponents consider certain actions to be evil always. Fletcher’s reply puts him nearer to the existentialist type of situation ethics than would appear from the rest of his writings: he stresses ‘the ambivalences and ambiguities that go along with freedom’ and the inability of anybody to assess objectively all of the motives, means and ends at stake. In this book, as in his other one, Fletcher is guilty of exasperating over-simplifications and non sequiturs For instance he maintains that love and justice are identical. To show this he spends three-and-a-half pages examining the meaning of the word ‘love’ and devotes three-and-a-half lines to justice. But perhaps it ought to be admitted that one reason for exasperation is that it is difficult to find a defensible alternative to Fletcher’s approach. The manuals certainly do not provide an answer. They, like Fletcher, fail to distinguish between abstract universality and concrete generality. Any attempt to base universal laws on an abstract ‘common denominator’ will result in legalism or leave the laws as mere guide-lines. A re-examination of what is meant by a universal principle is an urgent necessity. This book will have served a useful purpose if it brings this home to us.