Occasion-sensitive semantics for objective predicates

Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (5):451-474 (2019)
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Abstract

In this paper I propose a partition semantics for sentences containing objective predicates that takes into account the phenomenon of occasion-sensitivity associated with so-called Travis cases. The key idea is that the set of worlds in which a sentence is true has a more complex structure as a result of different ways in which it is made true. Different ways may have different capacities to support the attainment of a contextually salient domain goal. I suggest that goal-conduciveness decides whether some utterance of a sentence is accepted as true on a particular occasion at a given world. The utterance will not be accepted as true at a world which belongs to a truth-maker which is less conducive to a contextually salient goal than other truth-makers. Finally, the proposed occasion-sensitive semantics is applied to some cases of disagreement and cancellability.

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Tamara Dobler
University of East Anglia

Citations of this work

Contextual Injustice.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30.
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Pluralist conceptual engineering.Tamara Dobler - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):224-250.
Metasemantics without semantic intentions.Karen S. Lewis - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):991-1019.

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References found in this work

Minimal semantics.Emma Borg - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.

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