Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?

Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412 (2010)
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Abstract

We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.

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Author Profiles

Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani
California State University, Los Angeles
Roman Frigg
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Understanding (with) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1069-1099.
Understanding (With) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx005.
The Open Systems View.Michael E. Cuffaro & Stephan Hartmann - 2024 - Philosophy of Physics 2 (1):6:1-27.

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