Moral Understanding Between You and Me

Philosophy and Public Affairs 52 (3):327-357 (2024)
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Abstract

Much attention has been paid to moral understanding as an individual achievement, when a single agent gains insight into distinctly moral matters. Crucially overlooked, I argue, is the phenomenon of shared moral understanding, when you and I understand moral matters together, in a way that can’t be reduced to each of us having moral understanding on our own. My argument pays close attention to two central moral practices: justifying our actions to others, and apologizing for wrongdoing. I argue that, whenever I owe you a justification or an apology, I thereby owe it to you to aim at our coming to a shared moral understanding. My argument has two upshots. The first is a novel explanation of the importance of moral understanding in our lives, one that emphasizes the importance of understanding moral reasons together. The second is a better understanding of the very obligations involved in two of our most central interpersonal moral practices.

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Author's Profile

Samuel Dishaw
Université Catholique de Louvain

Citations of this work

Rethinking Respect.Clara Lingle - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.

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