A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping

Erkenntnis 79 (3):511-522 (2014)
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Abstract

On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported by current cognitive science research.

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John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
Dylan Sabo
Occidental College

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

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