No place for the a priori

Abstract

Why believe in the a priori? The answer is clear: there are many examples, drawn from mathematics, logic and philosophy, of knowledge that does not seem to be empirical. It does not seem possible that this knowledge could be justified or revised “by experience.” It must be justified in some other way, justified a priori.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,636

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

The place of the a priori in religious knowledge.Ray H. Turner - 1935 - Chicago,:
What Place for the A Priori? [REVIEW]Stuart Silvers - 2011 - Teaching Philosophy 34 (4):446-451.
What Place for the A Priori?Michael J. Shaffer & Michael L. Veber (eds.) - 2011 - Open Court.
Review of What Place for the A Priori? [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
The Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge.David Papineau - 2011 - In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael L. Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court. pp. 61.
Terror of Knowing: Can an Empiricist Avoid Unwanted A Priori Knowledge?Ümit D. Yalçın - 2011 - In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael L. Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court. pp. 241.
Two Conceptions of A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2003 - In A Priori Justification. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
49 (#450,909)

6 months
49 (#101,931)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Devitt
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong.Michael Devitt - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):669-699.
Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2015 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.
Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.
Futher reflections on semantic minimalism: Reply to Wedgwood.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 437-474..
Chalmers and Semantics.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references