A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences

Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):188-204 (2011)
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Abstract

The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences, but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.

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Citations of this work

Lessons from beyond vision (sounds and audition).Casey O’Callaghan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):143-160.
Attention in bodily awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
On the Significance of Bodily Awareness for Bodily Action.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):790-812.
Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.
Cognition as shaking hands with the world. Introduction.Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Tomasz Komendzinski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):11-16.

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