Antipathy as an Emotion

Acta Analytica 40 (1):133-154 (2025)
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Abstract

Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology.

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Bertille De Vlieger
Université Charles-de-Gaulle - Lille 3

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Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
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Upheavals of Thought.Martha Nussbaum - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (2):325-341.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.

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