Avner Baz on the ‘Point’ of a Question

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7):875-894 (2015)
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Abstract

Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind of ‘point’ possessed by ‘everyday’ questions. He concludes from this that there is something wrong with the philosophical practice of asking questions about hypothetical cases. This paper defends the practice from Baz’s criticism.

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2015-09-16

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Max Emil Deutsch
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Questioning the Method of Cases Fundamentally—Reply to Deutsch.Avner Baz - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):895-907.
Reply to Baz.Max Deutsch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):803-811.

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References found in this work

Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
On the Gettier problem problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington, Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.

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