Deflacyjna teoria prawdy Paula Horwicha i jej trudności

Filozofia Nauki 2 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The author characterize Paul Horwich's view on truth formulated in his deflationary theory of truth. She presents selected problems which arise when one analyze the elements of the theory in a more detailed way. She investigates the mentioned problems in order to show the importance of such categories like truth, acceptance, understanding, proposition and property for philosophy of language. The author concludes with a claim that philosophical acceptance (or antipathy) for minimalism in theory of truth is connected with some metaphysical assumptions which are taken for granted in advance

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,449

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Minimalism and the Facts About Truth.Marian David - 2001 - In Richard Schantz, What is Truth? Walter de Gruyter.
What do We Use “Truth” for: Criticizing Horwich’s Minimalism.Junpei Harada - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:65-69.
A Minimalist Theory of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):53-57.
Hollow Truth.Louis deRosset - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (4):533-581.
Truth and Assertability.Michael McDermott - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):465-470.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-14

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aleksandra Derra
Nicolaus Copernicus University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references