Abstract

This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a detailed descriptive summary of the interpretive commentaries following the publication of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. The material, thus assembled and presented as a whole for the first time, reveals unities directly traceable to assumptions and issues introduced by one man, Michael Dummett, who gave the interpretive literature its impetus, form and substance. ;The second part of the dissertation is of a critical nature. In this part it will be shown that Dummett's interpretation and assessment of Wittgenstein's philosophical activities is inadequate. Dummett's requirements for solving the problem of logical necessity require contradictory things of Wittgenstein. Further, the criteria which Dummett uses to judge the success of Wittgenstein's efforts are the very criteria which Wittgenstein attacks successfully in the Remarks. ;Having shown that the literature depends heavily on Dummett, and that Dummett is fundamentally mistaken, the third and remaining part of the dissertation attempts an expository sketch in which Wittgenstein's thoughts on logical necessity are provided. This sketch attempts to avoid the pitfalls of Dummett's approach and preserve Wittgenstein's avoidance of philosophical theorizing.