The ideal of sincerity: Notes on a footnote

Mind 89 (355):418-419 (1980)
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Abstract

This note discusses critically a point in a d m walker's paper "the ideal of sincerity" ("mind", October 1978). Walker claims that desires are insincere if corrupted by incompatible desires. This view accounts for some cases, But not for all. It is argued, In the note, That superficial, Factitious, 'got up' desires are judged insincere as such because not 'natural' to a man. This is implied by the claim of andre gide's which walker misinterprets. The issue of natural desires in contrast to artificial desires introduces the question of 'authenticity', Which is looked at in connection with lionel trilling's "sincerity and authenticity".

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