Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):65-72 (2016)
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Abstract

Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counterintuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.

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Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University

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