Commentary on John Dupré’s Human Nature and the Limits of Science [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):473–483 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Suppose we discovered that all the women in the Slobbovian culture exhibit a strong preference for blue-handled knives and red-handled forks. They would rather starve than eat with utensils of the wrong color. We’d be rightly puzzled, and eager to find an explanation. ‘Well,” these women tell us, “blue-handled knives are snazzier, you know. And just look at them: these red-handled forks are, well, just plain beautiful!” This should not satisfy us. Why do they say this? Their answers may make sense to them, and even to us, once we’ve managed to insert ourselves to some degree into their culture, but that is not the end of it. We want to know why there is a culture with such apparently arbitrary and unmotivated preferences. To us outsiders, the need for an answer stands out, even if the Slobbovians themselves think their answers are self-evident and quite satisfying. Similarly, we may think it is just obvious that laughter is the appropriate response to humor. Why are some female shapes sexy and others not? Isn’t it obvious? Just look at them! But that is not the end of it. The universalities, regularities and trends in our responses to the world do indeed guarantee, trivially, that they are part of “human nature,” but that still leaves the question of why. Something must pay for these extravagant features. What? To answer, we need to adopt an evolutionary point of view, which encourages us to look at all aspects of human nature from the sort of alien, Martian perspective that science thrives on. This perspective, self-consciously objective and bristling with hooks for attachment to the rest of science, is anathema to John Dupré. It reeks of “reductionism” and “scientism” and “economism”. He wants to preserve and even privilege the traditional “explanations” of such features of human nature, not just as part of the story but as a part that excuses us from hunting for deeper, unifying explanations of the same features. Wittgenstein famously said that explanation has to stop somewhere, and Dupré seems to want it to stop just before these curiously invasive evolutionary questions get posed.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,302

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are there Intrinsic Values in Nature?T. L. S. Sprigge - 1987 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1):21-28.
The science of consciousness: waking, sleeping and dreaming.Trevor A. Harley - 2021 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Moral Judges and Human Ideals.Susan Wolf - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):957-962.
Human nature and the limits of science.John Dupré - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What Need is There for an Environmental Aesthetics?Karsten Harries - 2011 - Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 22 (40-41).
Public goods and fairness.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):1 – 21.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
245 (#111,150)

6 months
22 (#130,078)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Dupre
University of Exeter

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom evolves.Daniel Clement Dennett - 2003 - New York: Viking Press.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.David L. Hull - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea.Daniel Dennett - 1994 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):169-174.

View all 11 references / Add more references