Preference for flexibility and dynamic consistency with incomplete preferences

Theory and Decision 90 (2):171-181 (2020)
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Abstract

We generalize a previous result about dynamically consistent menu preferences to the case where preferences are not necessarily complete. We show that, as it is the case when preferences are complete, a subjective state space version of dynamic consistency is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. In words, an objective signal is interpreted as an event in the agent’s subjective state space and the agent acts in a dynamically consistent way after that if and only if we can attribute all the differences between the agent’s preferences before and after the signal to the fact that the agent values flexibility more before the signal than after.

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Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 1989 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (2):141–53.

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