Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to make a new distinction in metaethics. Specifically, I distinguish between externalism and internalism about normative principle validity (hereafter EINP). The basic distinction concerns whether the facts that make a given principle normatively valid for some subject are 1) particular facts about that subject (or agent-relative facts) or 2) facts about the world and the nature of agency in general (or agent-neutral facts). I call positions which emphasize 1) internalist positions, and positions which favor 2) externalist positions. I defend the conceptual originality of the distinction by arguing that it isn’t reducible to judgment internalism/externalism, reasons internalism/externalism, or realism/anti-realism about morality. Thereafter, I demonstrate the distinction’s philosophical merit by showing how it can resolve a dispute between Korsgaard and her detractors about whether normative principles need to be capable of “getting a grip” on an agent.