Schelling’s Metametaphysical Critique of Hegel

International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-27 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article defends Hegel against Schelling’s critique that his system can only comprehend actuality but cannot explain it. It does so while granting Schelling’s his basic premise, namely, that Hegel’s system is entirely logical. Hegel’s account of comprehension effectively answers Schelling’s ‘despairing’ question: why is there something rather than nothing? In the first part, I reconstruct Schelling’s critique, showing that he takes Hegel’s system to be entirely logical; as logical, a priori, and as a priori, unable to explain existence. In the second part, I advance a moderately deflationary reading of Hegel on which philosophy, as comprehending cognition, guarantees the non-vacuity of its categories by deriving them through conceptually transforming the universals of empirical science. Given its compellingness as a response to Schelling’s critique, this moderately deflationary reading warrants further development as an interpretation of Hegel’s thought.

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Matthew J. Delhey
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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