Abstract

Brentano’s relationship to Alexander Bain has so far received little attention. The first part of this paper argues that the basic tenets of the so-called Intentionality thesis should be considered as systematically opposed to a complex of principles borrowed by Brentano from two major works by the scottish philosopher and psychologist: The Senses and the Intellect and the ‘Compendium’ on Mental and Moral Science. Bain’s doctrine is based on two sets of claims: T1 (1) There is only a negative definition of Mind: a definition “by contrast” as the “unextended”; (2) There is a small number of general properties, whose divison under “three heads” is all that can be offered as a positive definition of Mind; those heads are Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition. T2 (1) There is no one fact or property that embraces all the three; (2) the three classes of mental phenomena do not imply each other. Brentano’s reply is based on the very opposite claims: *T1 (1) there are several negative definitions of mind, all questionable, but there is (1.2) a positive definition of Mind, that is well-grounded and not subjected to further criticisms; (2) the division of mental phenomena must be restated on this new positive basis; the new “heads”of the new division are: Presentation, Judgement and Feeling. *T2 (1) there is one common property that does characterize every mental phenomenon (§ 5): Intentional In-existence; (2) the phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately “intertwined”; “there is no mental act in which all three are not present”. The second part of the paper discusses at length Brentano’s criticism of Bain’s theory of volition as a feeling-prompted activity.