Disobedience, Civil and Otherwise

Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):195-211 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While philosophers usually agree that there is room for civil disobedience in democratic societies, they disagree as to the proper justification and role of civil disobedience. The field has so far been divided into two camps—the liberal approach on the one hand, which associates the justification and role of civil disobedience with the good of justice, and the democratic approach on the other, which connects them with the value and good of democracy. William Smith’s Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy offers a ‘deliberative’ theory, which constitutes an attractive synthesis of the two camps as it conceives of civil disobedience as a guardian of both justice and deliberative democracy. In this review essay, I first revisit the ‘problem’ of civil disobedience, examining in particular the two pillars of the case against civil disobedience as Smith depicts it, namely, the prohibition on legal disobedience established by the moral duty to comply, and the notion that civil disobedience strains the bonds of civic friendship. I suggest, contra, that the duty to comply as Smith defends it fails to be comprehensive because it is tightly bound to deliberative democratic procedures, which are involved in the making of only a portion of authoritative decisions; and, contra, that civil disobedience does not strain, but instead invigorates, civic friendship. Second, I entertain the possibility that citizens have a moral duty, not a mere right, to resist injustice. I show that Smith’s theory, in particular his account of the moral duty to comply, provides the resources to defend a general duty to resist injustice which, depending on the circumstances, can demand protesting the law or frustrating injustice. Third, I contend that Smith’s conception of the different contexts of injustice—he identifies three main ones—should be expanded to include what I call ‘official disrespect’ and ‘deliberative ignorance’. I argue that each context offers reasons to disobey the law but not necessarily in the civil manner determined by Smith.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,902

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-17

Downloads
249 (#105,438)

6 months
23 (#130,350)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Candice Delmas
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

Civil Disobedience.Candice Delmas - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):681-691.
On (not) Accepting the Punishment for Civil Disobedience.Piero Moraro - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):503-520.
Retheorising Civil Disobedience in the Context of the Marginalised.Simon Stevens - 2024 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 71 (178):1-23.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Civil Disobedience.[author unknown] - 2018
The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing.Candice Delmas - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (1):77-105.
Letter from a Birmingham jail.Martin Luther King Jr - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA.
Civil Disobedience.Henry David Thoreau - 1991 - In Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience in Focus. Routledge.
Letter from a Birmingham jail.Martin Luther King Jr - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references