Consider the agent in the arthropod

Animal Sentience 29 (32) (2020)
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Abstract

—Commentary on Mikhalevich and Powell on invertebrate minds.— Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.

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References found in this work

A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
How to Count Animals, More or Less.Shelly Kagan - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.

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