Game-Theoretic Pragmatics Under Conflicting and Common Interests

Erkenntnis:1-52 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper combines a survey of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics with new models that fill some voids in that literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium-refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference

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reprint van Rooij, Robert; De Jaegher, Kris (2014) "Game-Theoretic Pragmatics Under Conflicting and Common Interests". Erkenntnis 79(Suppl 4):769-820

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References found in this work

Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson, The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.
Evolution and the explanation of meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
Sequential Equilibria.David Kreps - 1982 - Econometrica 50:863-894.
Logic and conversation.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - In Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 41-58.

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