Valuing Emotions

Philosophical Review 107 (4):617 (1998)
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Abstract

Stocker intends this book to redress the common failures of contemporary moral philosophers to see the importance of emotions for their field. His aim is not merely to point out deficiencies in current thinking about emotions and their place in ethics, however. It is also to show how emotions are important for ethics. The book is divided into ten chapters, four of which are written in collaboration with Elizabeth Hegeman, an anthropologist and psychoanalyst. The first seven present criticisms of current thinking and argue for some general theses about the way emotions are related to values. The last three examine specific emotions, notably, compassion, pity, pride, shame, and anger. They serve to substantiate the general theses about the way emotions are related to values that the first seven chapters promote. In this review I will concentrate on the material in these first seven chapters. Though some of it is jointly authored, I will for convenience' sake mostly refer just to Stocker as the author.

Other Versions

original Stocker, Michael; Hegeman, Elizabeth (1996) "Valuing Emotions". Mind 110(439):860-864
reprint Stocker, Michael; Hegeman, Elizabeth (1996) "Valuing Emotions". Philosophy 73(284):308-311

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John Deigh
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.
Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):602-626.
XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency.Karen Jones - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:181-200.
Arrogance, anger and debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):213-227.

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